Sometimes, but it is much harder than suing a state or local officer. The statute most civil-rights suits use, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, covers only people acting under state authority. For federal agents, the options are a judge-made damages claim called a Bivens action, which the Supreme Court now refuses to extend to almost any new situation, or a claim against the United States itself under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which has its own exceptions and strict administrative deadlines.
Congress passed § 1983 in 1871 to give people a federal court when state officials trampled their rights. It never wrote an equivalent statute for federal officials. Nearly everything about suing an FBI agent, a Border Patrol agent, an immigration officer, or a federal prison guard follows from that gap: a remedy the Supreme Court created in 1971, a decades-long retreat from it, and a tort statute that lets people sue the government rather than the agent.
Key takeaways
- Section 1983 applies to state and local officials, not federal ones, so suits against federal agents rely on other routes.
- The Bivens remedy was recognized in three cases between 1971 and 1980, and the Court has refused to extend it to any new context since.
- Egbert v. Boule says a court should not recognize a Bivens claim if there is “any rational reason (even one)” to think Congress is better suited to decide.
- Federal officers sued under Bivens can still raise qualified immunity; Harlow v. Fitzgerald itself involved federal officials.
- The Federal Tort Claims Act lets people sue the United States under state tort law, but a written claim must reach the agency within two years, usually on Standard Form 95.
I.Why § 1983 stops at the federal line
Section 1983 creates liability for any person who violates federal rights “under color of” the law of a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia. That phrase is the hook for suits against police officers, sheriffs’ deputies, state prison guards, and other state and local officials. It does not cover officials whose authority comes from federal law. An agent of the FBI, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or the Bureau of Prisons acts under federal authority, so § 1983 is simply the wrong statute.
That leaves three possible paths, and they work very differently.
| Path | Who is sued | Where the right comes from | Main obstacles |
|---|---|---|---|
| 42 U.S.C. § 1983 | State and local officials | A statute passed by Congress | Qualified immunity; does not reach federal agents |
| Bivens claim | The individual federal officer | Implied by the Supreme Court from the Constitution | Almost never extended to new contexts; qualified immunity still applies |
| Federal Tort Claims Act | The United States | A statute that borrows state tort law | Written agency claim and deadlines; statutory exceptions, including discretionary functions |
II.Bivens and its two siblings
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by federal agents could sue those agents for damages, even though no statute said so. Webster Bivens alleged that federal narcotics agents searched his home and arrested him without a warrant. The Court reasoned that the Constitution’s guarantees mean little without a way to enforce them.
The Court extended that reasoning twice. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), it recognized a damages claim under the Fifth Amendment for a congressional staffer who alleged sex discrimination by her employer, a member of Congress. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), it recognized an Eighth Amendment claim on behalf of a federal prisoner who allegedly received inadequate medical care.
Those three cases are, in practice, the whole map. A claim that looks like one of them may proceed. A claim that differs in a meaningful way is a “new context,” and new contexts are where the door has closed.
III.The retreat: Abbasi, Hernández, and Egbert
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017), the Court declined to extend Bivens to claims arising from the detention of noncitizens after the September 11 attacks, and it framed expansion of the remedy as a disfavored judicial activity. In Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93 (2020), it refused to allow a damages claim against a Border Patrol agent who shot and killed a Mexican teenager across the border.
The case at a glance
- Caption
- Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022)
- Facts
- Robert Boule, who runs an inn in Blaine, Washington, at the Canadian border, alleged that Border Patrol agent Erik Egbert used excessive force on his property and then retaliated after Boule complained
- Claims
- Fourth Amendment excessive force; First Amendment retaliation
- Holding
- No Bivens remedy for either claim; Ninth Circuit reversed
- Opinion
- Thomas, J.; Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment; Sotomayor, J., joined by Breyer and Kagan, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part
Egbert is the case that made the retreat nearly complete. The Court said the question is whether there is “any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress is better suited” to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action. Border security, national security, and the existence of a Border Patrol grievance process were each enough. The majority went further, observing that if the Court were asked to decide Bivens today, it “would decline to discover any implied causes of action in the Constitution.” It stopped short of overruling the case.
Justice Sotomayor’s partial dissent would have let Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim go forward, arguing it fit comfortably within Bivens itself: a federal officer, an alleged unreasonable use of force, and a citizen on his own property. The dissent’s point is worth sitting with. If a claim that closely resembles the original case is still a “new context,” very little will ever qualify.
IV.Qualified immunity still applies
Even a Bivens claim that survives this gauntlet faces the same defense state officers raise. The modern qualified immunity test was announced in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), a suit against two senior aides to President Nixon, which is to say federal officials. Federal officers sued for damages may argue that the right they allegedly violated was not “clearly established,” the same argument that ended the case in Zorn v. Linton. A plaintiff suing a federal agent personally must therefore clear two hurdles that each, on its own, defeats many claims.
V.The FTCA: suing the United States instead
The Federal Tort Claims Act, found at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and §§ 2671–2680, takes a different approach. It waives the federal government’s immunity for certain torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their jobs, and it measures liability by the tort law of the state where the conduct happened. The defendant is the United States, not the agent, and qualified immunity is not part of the analysis.
The FTCA comes with exceptions, listed in § 2680. Two matter most for law enforcement. The discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a) bars claims based on a federal employee’s performance of a discretionary function or duty, “whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” The intentional-tort exception in § 2680(h) bars claims arising out of assault, battery, false arrest, and several other intentional torts.
But § 2680(h) contains a proviso. For acts or omissions of federal “investigative or law enforcement officers,” defined as officers empowered by law to execute searches, seize evidence, or make arrests for violations of federal law, the FTCA does apply to claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. Justice Sotomayor has traced the proviso’s origins to wrongful federal drug raids on homes in Collinsville, Illinois, in 1973.
VI.The wrong-house raid: Martin v. United States
The Supreme Court addressed how those pieces fit together in Martin v. United States, 605 U.S. ___ (2025), No. 24-362, decided June 12, 2025. According to the opinion, FBI agents in suburban Atlanta set out in October 2017 to raid a suspected gang hideout and instead raided the wrong house, where Curtrina Martin, her partner Hilliard Toi Cliatt, and her seven-year-old son lived. They sued the United States under the FTCA. The Eleventh Circuit ruled against them, relying in part on a Supremacy Clause defense and on a reading of the law-enforcement proviso that let it override the FTCA’s other exceptions.
A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Gorsuch, vacated that judgment. It held that the Supremacy Clause does not give the government a defense in FTCA suits; as the Court put it, the FTCA is “the ‘supreme’ federal law” governing the United States’ liability for its agents’ torts. And it held that the law-enforcement proviso overrides only the intentional-tort exception in § 2680(h), not the discretionary-function exception in § 2680(a). The Court sent the case back for the lower courts to decide whether the discretionary-function exception bars the family’s claims, and it did not resolve that question itself. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, concurred, suggesting the discretionary-function exception may not reach claims like these.
Martin removed one barrier and left the most important one standing. Whether wrong-house raids count as protected “discretionary” conduct is still being fought out in the lower courts.
VII.Deadlines and the administrative claim
An FTCA case does not start in court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), a tort claim against the United States is “forever barred” unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years after it accrues, and unless suit is filed within six months after the agency mails notice of final denial. Justice Department regulations treat a claim as presented when the agency receives an executed Standard Form 95, or other written notice of the incident, together with a demand for money damages in a sum certain.
Those rules are unforgiving, and a Bivens claim against an individual officer is subject to its own, separate time limits. Filing deadlines apply to every path described here. If you believe a federal officer violated your rights, consult a licensed attorney promptly, before any deadline can run.
Frequently asked questions
Can you sue a federal agent under Section 1983?
No. Section 1983 covers people acting under the authority of state, territorial, or District of Columbia law. Federal agents act under federal authority, so claims against them must use a Bivens action or the Federal Tort Claims Act.
What is a Bivens claim?
A Bivens claim is a damages lawsuit against an individual federal officer for violating the Constitution. The Supreme Court recognized it in 1971 and extended it in 1979 and 1980, but it has refused to extend it to any new context since.
Do federal officers get qualified immunity?
Yes. Federal officers sued for damages can raise qualified immunity. The modern test came from Harlow v. Fitzgerald, a 1982 case brought against senior aides to President Nixon.
What is the Federal Tort Claims Act?
The FTCA lets people sue the United States, rather than the individual employee, for certain torts committed by federal employees on the job. Liability follows the tort law of the state where the conduct occurred, subject to exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. 2680.
What did Martin v. United States decide?
In 2025 the Supreme Court unanimously held that the government has no Supremacy Clause defense to FTCA claims and that the law-enforcement proviso overrides only the intentional-tort exception, not the discretionary-function exception. It sent the wrong-house raid case back to the lower courts.
How long do you have to file an FTCA claim?
Under 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), a written claim must be presented to the federal agency within two years after the claim accrues, and a lawsuit must be filed within six months after the agency mails a final denial. Talk to a licensed attorney promptly.
Editorial note: This analysis is built from the cited opinions, statutes, and regulations listed below. It is journalism and advocacy, not legal advice. If you believe your rights were violated, talk to a licensed civil-rights attorney in your state. Corrections: contact the editor.